Previous researchers have speculated that incumbency effects are larger when voters have weaker partisan preferences, but evidence for this relationship is surprisingly weak. We offer a fresh look at the question by examining the U.K.'s multiparty system. In general, the electoral value of incumbency should depend on the proportion of voters who are nearly indifferent between the parties competing for incumbency; in a multiparty system, that proportion may differ across constituencies depending on which parties are locally competitive. After first showing that U.K. voters in recent decades have stronger preferences between Conservatives and Labour than between Conservatives and Liberals, we show that incumbency effects are larger in close contests between Conservatives and Liberals than in close contests between Conservatives and Labour. By documenting how partisanship influences incumbency effects, our analysis shows that the comparative study of incumbency effects offers broader insights into electoral accountability across political systems.
Introduction
The study of incumbency effects started with questions about the re-election rate of members of the U.S. Congress 1 and developed into a huge literature in American politics examining the trajectory and source of incumbents' electoral advantages. 2 In recent years, researchers have begun to examine incumbency effects outside the U.S. (see e.g. Hainmueller and Kern 2008; Uppal 2009; Kendall and Rekkas 2012; Ariga 2015) . While this comparative literature builds on questions about incumbent insulation that motivated the early U.S. studies, it also has the potential to yield insights into a broader set of questions about how the behavior of politicians and voters varies with the nature of political campaigns, legislative institutions, and party systems.
One explanation for variation in incumbency effects is partisanship, by which we mean the strength of voters' preferences between competing parties. Scholars studying American elections have suggested that the rise of incumbency effects in the post-World War II U.S. might be explained by the weakening of ties between voters and parties (Mayhew 1974; Krehbiel and Wright 1983; Ansolabehere et al. 2006 ); Jacobson (2015) attributed a recent drop in incumbency advantage to rising partisanship. Similarly, a number of researchers argue that incumbency effects are weaker in the U.K. than in the U.S. because British voters have stronger partisan preferences (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1984; Gaines 1998; Katz and King 1999) .
Although variation in the strength of party preferences seems to make sense of important variation in incumbency effects in the U.S. and between the U.S. and U.K., the evidence for a relationship between partisanship and incumbency effects (whether in these cases or elsewhere) remains surprisingly weak. There are of course many differences between elections in the U.S. and the U.K. other than the strength of party preferences that could explain why incumbency effects are larger in the U.S. For example, campaign spending in British parliamentary elections is tightly restricted at the constituency level (and has been since the late 19th century), whereas spending in U.S. federal campaigns has never been restricted; to the extent that the incumbency advantage in the U.S. results from campaign spending (Fouirnaies and Hall 2014) , this difference in regulation alone could 1 See e.g. Erikson (1971) ; Mayhew (1974) ; Fiorina (1977); Ferejohn (1977) . 2 See e.g. Krehbiel and Wright (1983) ; Gelman and King (1990) ; Cox and Morgenstern (1993) ; Levitt and Wolfram (1997) ; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2000) ; Lee (2008) explain the difference in levels. The evidence for partisanship as an explanation for changes in incumbency effects in the U.S. is more convincing but remains incomplete. For example, Krehbiel and Wright (1983, p. 140 ) examine data on party identification and vote choice in the U.S., concluding that "partisan dealignment accounts for little of the increase in incumbency voting"; Ansolabehere et al. (2006) examine a change in the ballot format in Minnesota and conclude that incumbency effects did not drop when voters were given stronger party cues (see also Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002) . Ansolabehere et al. (2007) find evidence of a larger (and earlier) incumbency advantage in U.S. primaries than in general elections; this pattern fits the partisanship view but could also be due to differences between the primary electorate and the general electorate. 3 Jacobson (2015) shows that the growth and decline of incumbency advantage in the U.S. is mirrored by changes in party loyalty and split-ticket voting over the same period, but of course many other things changed over the same period (e.g. financing and campaigning techniques, popular support for Congress) that could be seen as alternative explanations. In general, the difficulty researchers face in empirically linking partisanship and incumbency effects is that most variation in the strength of partisan preferences (e.g. across countries or over time within a country) coincides with variation in other relevant factors that potentially confound the analysis.
To address this problem, we study variation in incumbency effects within the U.K.'s multiparty system, where the strength of the relevant partisan preferences varies depending on the identity of the top two parties while many other contextual factors remain constant. The theoretical basis for a relationship between incumbency effects and partisanship is fairly straightforward: if incumbency status makes a candidate more attractive to voters (for whatever reason), this change in attractiveness will produce greater electoral benefits when a larger proportion of the electorate is relatively indifferent between the incumbent and her competitors on partisan grounds. The multiparty U.K. system offers an attractive setting to test this theory because in some places incumbency changes hands between the Conservatives and Labour, while in others it changes hands between 3 For example, it seems likely that the primary electorate is more aware of the incumbent's activities in office. Ansolabehere et al. (2007) also provide intriguing evidence of larger primary incumbency effects in states with weaker intra-party factions, though they caution that this pattern is based on a small number of states.
the Conservatives and Liberals; 4 we show using survey data that more voters are nearly indifferent between the Conservatives and the Liberals than between the Conservatives and Labour, which implies that the electoral implications of shifts in incumbency between Conservative and Liberals should be larger than the electoral implications of a shift between Conservatives and Labour. In line with the theory and this survey evidence, we find that incumbency effects are indeed larger in Conservative-Liberal contests than in Conservative-Labour contests, and that this difference is robust to controlling for other differences between the two types of contests. Our analysis of a single political system thus produces unusually clear evidence that incumbency effects are larger when party preferences are weaker.
Of course, one could offer alternative explanations for the variation we find in incumbency effects across partisan matchups. Notably, Gaines (1998) and Katz and King (1999) both assert that Liberals experience larger incumbency effects in the U.K. because of strategic voting: briefly, their explanation is that Liberal incumbency signals to Liberal supporters that the Liberal candidate is locally viable, which discourages Liberal supporters from strategically voting Labour or Conservative. Another alternative explanation is that there might be something different about Liberal MPs that explains why incumbency is more consequential in Conservative-Liberal contests. We test both of these alternative explanations with survey data and fail to find evidence for either. We recognize, of course, that it is impossible to completely rule out all possible alternative explanations for the patterns we see; we note, however, that some of these other explanations (such as the idea that Liberals tend to be better at establishing connections with their constituencies) could instead be seen as further results of the variation in partisanship we document.
Our results have several implications for the comparative study of elections. Most directly, they provide evidence that incumbency effects are relatively small in the United Kingdom in part because of the strength of voters' partisan preferences: if partisan preferences in all constituencies had been at the level of constituencies where Conservatives and Liberals vie for a seat, the effect of 4 We use the term "Liberals" to refer to Liberals, Liberal Democrats, Social Democrats, and candidates running under the SDP-Liberal Alliance. Incumbency also changes hands in a smaller number of cases between Labour and the Liberals; we focus on Conservative pairs both for simplicity and for statistical power.
incumbency on vote share in the post-World War II period would have been about twice as large on average and considerably closer to U.S. levels. This insight may also be useful in explaining why incumbency effects have risen (and, perhaps, fallen) in the U.S. and more broadly why incumbency effects vary across countries and electoral systems. In light of our analysis, the comparative study of incumbency effects is not just about what incumbents in various systems do to protect their positions; rather, it can shed light on broader questions about how electoral accountability and partisan preferences vary both across and within political systems, as we explain further in the conclusion.
Incumbency effects and party preferences in multiparty systems
In this section we clarify why incumbency effects might be expected to vary across party pairs in a multiparty system, emphasizing the strength of partisan preferences. Like much of the recent literature since Lee (2008) , our analysis of incumbency effects asks how a party's performance in a constituency in a given election is affected by whether it won or lost the previous election in the constituency, conditional on the previous election being close. For example, supposing the Conservatives won in a constituency at time t − 1, how would the Conservatives' result in that constituency at time t have been different if instead the Conservatives had lost at time t − 1? The difference between these two scenarios is the party incumbency effect for the Conservatives. As noted by Lee (2008) and discussed further by Erikson and Titiunik (2015) and Fowler and Hall (2014) , earlier work on U.S. elections focused on different estimands, including the benefit for an individual of running as an incumbent (Erikson 1971) and the benefit for a party of fielding the incumbent candidate (Gelman and King 1990) . The theoretical analysis and predictions of this paper would apply to any of these approaches; we focus on the party incumbency effect (which we will refer to simply as the incumbency effect in the remainder of the paper) because it has been the dominant approach in recent empirical research, including as the basis for estimates of individual incumbency effects (e.g. Erikson and Titiunik 2015; Fowler 2014 ).
We make two key assumptions about voter preferences and the role of incumbency in vote choice. First, we assume that voters care about two things when it comes to candidates for office: their party and their personal qualities, which we will refer to as "valence". If a voter prefers party A over party B, she will vote for party A's candidate if all candidates have the same valence, but she might vote for party B's candidate if she perceives that candidate to be more capable or hard-working. Second, we assume that voters perceive incumbents to have higher valence than the average candidate; this might be because voters value incumbents' experience in office, or because ineffective incumbents tend to retire, or for some other reason. 5
Given these assumptions, how do incumbency effects depend on the strength of voters' partisan preferences? Consider first a system involving only two parties (say, Conservatives and Labour).
It follows from the assumptions stated in the previous paragraph that the magnitude of the incumbency effect will depend on two key factors: first, the difference in average valence between incumbents and other candidates; second, the proportion of voters who are nearly indifferent between the Conservatives and Labour, such that a change in incumbency will change their preference ordering. If the Conservatives won the previous election (and thus they are the incumbents), they subsequently receive the support of all voters who prefer the Conservatives to Labour plus those voters who narrowly prefer Labour but are swayed by incumbency; if the Conservatives lost the previous election (and thus Labour are the incumbents), the Conservatives receive the support of all voters who prefer the Conservatives to Labour except those voters who narrowly prefer the Conservatives but are swayed by incumbency. Thus the incumbency effect for the Conservatives depends on the proportion of voters who are nearly indifferent between the two parties, such that they vote for whichever candidate is from the incumbent party. 6
The relationship between incumbency effects and partisan preferences becomes more complicated when we consider systems with more than two parties, such as the UK. The key feature of multiparty competition that we leverage in this paper is that the value of incumbency may differ depending on what pair of parties is vying for incumbency: in our case, the electoral value to the Conservatives of defeating a Liberal opponent may differ from the electoral value to the Conservatives of defeating a Labour opponent. We define two distinct incumbency effects: the 5 All of our arguments would work in reverse if incumbency was on average a valence disadvantage.
6 Note that the incumbency effect for Labour will be the same: assuming just two parties, one party's loss is the other's gain and thus the effect is symmetric. 
Summary of implications
Assuming that incumbency boosts candidate valence, the size of electoral incumbency effects will depend on the strength of party preferences both in two-party settings and in multiparty settings.
In a multiparty setting we can consider different incumbency effects for each party pair (e.g. the effect of the Conservatives being the incumbent as opposed to Labour); whether we assume that voting behavior is purely strategic or purely sincere (in the sense defined above), the relative magnitude of these incumbency effects will depend on the proportion of voters who are nearly indifferent between the two parties. Under strategic voting, the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect is larger than the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect if more voters are nearly indifferent between the Conservatives and the Liberals than are nearly indifferent between the Conservatives and Labour; under sincere voting, the former effect is larger than the latter effect if more voters are nearly indifferent between the Conservatives and the Liberals and place Labour last than are nearly indifferent between the Conservatives and Labour and place the Liberals last.
Party preferences and expectations about incumbency effects in the UK
In this section we use survey data from the UK to show that voters in recent decades have had stronger preferences between the Conservatives and Labour than between the Conservatives and the Liberals. In recent general elections, the British Election Study (BES) has asked voters to give a 0-10 score to each of the major parties, with 0 indicating "strongly dislike" and 10 indicating "strongly like". As a rough indication of the proportion of voters who are nearly indifferent between two parties, we examine the proportion of voters whose scores for the two parties are within a given amount; recognizing that voters may apply different implicit scales in assigning 0-10 scores to parties, we examine both the raw scores and normalized versions. Liberal. This suggests that under the pure strategic voting assumption introduced above (i.e. voters choose between the two parties vying for incumbency) the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect would be larger than the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect.
The top right plot of Figure 1 shows the same basic information with the extra condition that the two parties must be at the top of the respondent's preference ordering. This plot tells us, for example, that about 9% of respondents place the Conservative and Labour parties within two points and above the Liberals, compared to about 19% who place the Conservative and Liberal parties within two points and above Labour. This suggests that under the pure sincere voting assumption introduced above (i.e. voters choose the candidate they like best) the ConservativeLiberal incumbency effect would be larger than the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect.
In the bottom plot of Figure 1 , we present an alternative version in which we normalize each respondent's like-dislike scores such that the largest pairwise gap among the main three parties for each respondent is 1. 7 We then show the (weighted) proportion of respondents with a gap in normalized scores below a given value. The plot indicates that about half of respondents placed the Conservatives and Liberals within half a point on the normalized scale, while only about 20%
7 Thus a respondent who gives scores of 2, 4, and 8 to the Conservatives, Labour, and Liberals would have normalized scores of 0, 1/3, and 1, and a respondent who gives scores of 2, 3, and 4
would have normalized scores of 0, 1/2, and 1. Note: The British Election Study asks respondents to rate each party on a 0-10 scale. In each plot the black curves show the (weighted) proportion of all respondents who place each pair of parties within a given interval, where the interval varies from 0 to the maximum possible value; the gray curves show the same information for respondents who live in constituencies where the given party pair finished in the top two in the previous election. In the upper right plot we apply the extra condition that the respondent ranks the other major party last. In the lower plot we normalize each respondent's scores such that the highest is 1 and the lowest is 0.
of respondents placed the Conservatives and Labour within the same margin. Because any gap less than one indicates that a party pair was at the top of the respondent's preference ordering, this shows that whether we assume pure strategic voting or pure sincere voting (as defined in the previous section), we should expect the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect to be larger than the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect.
The evidence presented so far in this section suggests that in the entire UK electorate the proportion of voters whose support for the Conservatives would depend on whether the Conservatives or the Liberals hold a seat (the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect) is larger than the proportion of voters whose support for the Conservatives would depend on whether the Conservatives or Labour hold a seat (the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect). An important complication to raise at this point is that we cannot credibly estimate these two incumbency effects for the entire UK electorate or any other fixed set of voters: there are few if any constituencies in which we can obtain a credible estimate of Conservative support under hypothetical Conservative incumbency, Labour incumbency, and Liberal incumbency. What we can do is focus on cases where the Conservatives are in close competition with either Labour or the Liberals and use a regression discontinuity design (Lee 2008) to estimate the incumbency effect separately for the ConservativeLabour cases and the Conservative-Liberal cases. where the previous election was close.) Our empirical analysis will use the Conservative-Liberal cases to estimate the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect and the Conservative-Labour cases to estimate the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect; extending the typical RDD, we will apply statistical controls to allow for differences in the two types of cases (such as when they took place, given the Conservative-Liberal contests tend to be more recent).
Given that we will be using different sets of cases to estimate the different incumbency effects, it is worth looking at the party-pair preferences that are relevant to each type of battleground. The which suggests that the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect we find in Conservative-Liberal battlegrounds will be larger than what we would hypothetically find in Conservative-Labour battlegrounds or for the electorate as a whole. There is a smaller discrepancy in the opposite direction when we look at normalized scores in the bottom plot. The overall implication is that incumbency effects in Conservative-Liberal contests should be larger than incumbency effects in ConservativeLabour contests; this is basically because of preference patterns that apply in the whole electorate, but the difference may be exacerbated due to differences in preferences across different types of battlegrounds. Note: In the left plot, in black we show the (weighted) proportion of respondents who are nearly indifferent between a pair of parties based on BES like/dislike scores (where indifference means placing within two points on the 0-10 scale used from 2001 and within one point on the five-point scale used before that); in gray we add the requirement that the respondent must rank the other party below both parties in the pair. In the right plot we use a relative measure of indifference: each respondent's like/dislike scores are normalized such that the highest is 1 and the lowest is zero; we show the (weighted) proportion for whom the given party pair is within half a point on this scale.
Incumbency effects by party matchup
We now turn to assessing the variation in incumbency effects across party matchups: for Conservative candidates, is the electoral benefit of defeating a Liberal opponent larger than the electoral benefit of defeating a Labour opponent? As explained above, we estimate incumbency effects using a regression discontinuity design (Lee 2008) . The fundamental idea behind RDD approaches to incumbency effects is to study the effect of election outcomes at time t − 1 on election outcomes in the same constituency at time t, focusing on close elections to minimize the endogeneity of time t − 1 electoral outcomes. We first estimate the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect and Conservative-Labour incumbency effect separately; to address differences between ConservativeLiberal and Conservative-Labour battlegrounds, we then extend the RDD to include interactions with covariates.
Comparisons based on separate RDD estimates The binned means closest to the threshold in Figure 4 indicate that when the Conservatives won a close race over either Labour or the Liberals, they won on average about 45% of the vote in the next election; when they lost a close race to Labour, they won 43% in the next election whereas when they lost a close race to the Liberals they won only about 38% in the next election. The difference between the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect and the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect is even larger when we look at the probability of Conservative victory at time t in Figure 5 . In that figure, the binned means closest to the threshold suggest an incumbency advantage in close races against Labour of perhaps 10 percentage points (though the shape of the conditional expectation function implies that the true effect at the threshold is smaller), while the advantage in close races against the Liberals is around 45 percentage points. 
Comparisons based on local linear regressions with interactions
Although the difference we have documented between the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect and the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect is consistent with the theory and evidence presented in the previous two sections, there are of course many possible reasons for this difference. For example, it could be that incumbency effects are smaller in urban constituencies, and close elections involving Conservative and Labour candidates are more common in urban places; it could be that incumbency effects are larger in recent elections, and close elections involving Conservative and Liberal candidates are more common in recent elections. To address these possibilities we extend the standard RDD approach. In particular, we begin with the local linear approach to RDD estimation, which fits a model like
where Y it is the Conservatives' electoral outcome (vote share or an indicator for victory) at time t , 
In this first extension of the model, the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect is measured by β 2 and the difference between the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect and the ConservativeLabour incumbency effect is measured by β 6 . We then extend the model further by also including covariates X it and their interaction with ConWon i,t−1 :
In this second extension of the model, the effect of incumbency is also allowed to vary across values of X it , e.g. over time or between urban and rural constituencies. Our question is whether the difference between the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect and the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect, as measured by β 6 , is robust to allowing the incumbency effect to vary with other attributes in X it that might differ between the cases in which Conservatives have close elections with Liberals and cases in which they have close elections with Labour.
Column 1 of Table 1 Note: Column 1 reports the coefficient and standard error for β 2 from our estimate of Equation 1. Column 2 reports β 2 and β 5 (the interaction) from our estimate of Equation 2. Columns 3-8 report β 2 and β 5 (the interaction) from our estimate of Equation 3 including different covariates and their interaction with the indicator for Conservative victory at t − 1. Regressions use triangular kernel weights with CCT bandwidths reported above each panel. *** -p < .001, ** -p < .01, * -p < .05, † -p < 0.1.
Column 2 of Table 1 In Columns 3-8 of Table 1 we report results for the main effect and interaction when we also of Conservative incumbency on the probability of subsequent Conservative victory that is between two and three times larger when the opponent was a Liberal. All of these interaction coefficients are significant at the p<.01 level.
Tests of RDD validity and other falsification checks
The validity of the sharp regression discontinuity design depends on the assumption that potential outcomes are continuous across the threshold at which treatment is applied; in this setting, this assumption essentially requires that we can use the Conservatives' narrow losses to infer what would Note: Continuity in the density of the running variable across the threshold suggests the key assumption of RDD is met.
have happened to narrow Conservative winners if they had actually lost. Although this assumption is not directly testable, we can perform several indirect tests, including both standard tests and tests that are tailored to the specific research design used above to compare incumbency effects across party pairings (Eggers et al. 2015) .
The continuity assumption may be violated if some parties or candidates can precisely manipulate their margin of victory -for example, if Conservatives could disproportionately win close elections. Figure 7 addresses this possibility. Each of the panels of Figure 7 shows the density of the Conservative vote margin, estimated separately on each side of the threshold separating cases where the Conservatives won and lost; the left and right panels apply to cases where the Conservatives' main competitor was Labour and Liberal, respectively. The standard McCrary (2008) test for manipulation of the running variable checks for a discontinuity in the density at the threshold.
As suggested by the plots, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no jump at the threshold in both cases, as well as for both sets of cases combined, 13 which is consistent with the assumption that narrow Conservative wins and losses are comparable.
As another indirect test of the continuity assumption, we check whether pre-treatment covariates are continuous at the threshold separating narrow winners and losers. We test this assumption by 13 The three Z-statistics are -.12, -.96, and -.49. Note: Both plots show the proportion of elections taking place in boroughs as a function of the Conservatives' vote margin in the previous election. Constituencies are divided according to the whether the top two parties in the previous election were the Conservatives and Labour (left plot) or the Conservatives and the Liberals (right plot).
estimating the "effect" of Conservative victory at time t − 1 on outcomes determined before period t − 1: an indicator for whether the constituency is a borough or a county (a measure of urban-ness), an indicator for whether the constituency is in England, the year of the election, and three measures of the Conservative performance at time t − 2 (margin, vote share, and an indicator for victory).
If the continuity assumption required for RDD is valid, these falsification tests should show null effects. For example, Figure 8 shows the RDD plot for the "effect" of Conservative victory at time t − 1 on an indicator for whether the election took place in a borough. The plot confirms that close Conservative-Labour contests were more common in urban areas (as indicated by the higher overall proportion of elections taking place in boroughs in that subset), but within each subset close Conservative victories and losses appear to be equally likely to take place in boroughs.
Extending Figure 8 , we report estimated effects of Conservative victory on pre-treatment covariates separately by party pairing in the first two columns of Table 2 . Each entry is the RDD estimate (with bias correction) of the effect of Conservative victory at time t − 1 on the pre-treatment covariate listed at the left; we estimate these separately for cases where the Conservative's opponent was Labour or Liberal. None of the "effects" is significant, which is what we would expect if the Note: In columns 1 and 2, each entry is the RDD estimate (robust standard error in parentheses) of the effect of Conservative victory at time t − 1 on the pre-treatment covariate listed at left. In columns 3 and 4, each entry is a coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) from a local linear regression like Equation 2 in which the outcome is the pre-treatment covariate listed at left; coefficients shown relate to the treatment (Conservative victory at time t − 1) and the interaction between the treatment and an indicator for Liberal opponent. Significance levels as in Table 1. continuity assumption is met.
In the last two columns of Table 2 we present another falsification test that complements the analysis in Table 1 . In Table 1 we used an interaction term to test whether the effect of incumbency on subsequent Conservative performance depends on whether the Conservatives' opponent was Labour or Liberal. In the last two columns of Table 2 we use the same approach, this time using pre-treatment covariates as the outcome; this allows us to check whether the difference in incumbency effects we found with this approach in Table 1 could be due to differences in covariate balance across types of battlegrounds. The last column of Table 2 reports the coefficient on the interaction from each regression; none of these is close to statistical significance, suggesting that differences in covariate imbalance do not explain why incumbency effects are estimated to be larger in Conservative-Liberal matchups. 14
Additional alternative explanations
The difference between the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect and the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect that we have shown is consistent with the pattern of preference intensity documented earlier: all else equal, we would expect a larger incumbency effect in Conservative-Liberal contests given the larger proportion of voters who are nearly indifferent between the main parties in those contests. The extended-RDD analysis in the previous section addressed a few alternative explanations for this pattern based on time period and constituency characteristics. In this section we consider two additional alternative explanations.
Does strategic voting explain the larger incumbency effect for Liberals?
As noted in the introduction, previous studies of incumbency effects in the U.K. noted that incumbency seemed to matter more for the Liberals than for other parties (Gaines 1998; Katz and King 1999) . This is what we would expect given the pattern of partisan preference intensity documented above: incumbency should matter more for Liberals because there are more voters whose ranking of the Liberals might depend on small valence shocks. But previous studies interpreted this finding differently: both Gaines (1998) and Katz and King (1999) suggest that Liberals have larger incumbency effects because of strategic voting. The key idea expressed in both papers is that incumbency has extra value for Liberals because it signals the local viability of the Liberal candidate to party supporters who may be inclined to vote strategically for another party; incumbency is assumed to play this role to a lesser extent for Labour and the Conservatives because voters who favor those parties simply assume their party is viable and vote for their top choice. Thus as Gaines notes (185), "the bonus of incumbency for Liberal candidates is not merely that they acquire whatever normal advantages office-holding confers, but also that it lets them overcome an electoral logic plaguing their party." If there is a substantial pool of strategic voters who only vote for the Liber- 14 We do find a significant main effect for the last outcome (an indicator for lagged Conservative victory); inspection of the RD plots suggest that this is because of under-smoothing, i.e. curvature in the conditional expectation function that causes bias in the local linear regression.
als when there is a Liberal incumbent because they otherwise assume the Liberals are not viable, then this could be enough to explain both Gaines (1998) and Katz and King (1999) 's finding that incumbency matters more to the Liberals and our finding that incumbency matters more to the Conservatives when they face a Liberal incumbent. The strength of partisan preferences need not be a factor at all.
The key element of this alternative explanation is that incumbency must signal viability for Liberals: we should find that the perceived viability of the Liberals is higher when they won the previous election in the constituency than when they lost, all else equal. We might also expect this to be true for the Liberals when they compete against the Conservatives, but not for Labour when they compete against the Conservatives. In the Online Appendix we also use our interaction approach to show that incumbency effects are larger in Conservative-Liberal contests even controlling for the extent to which there might be 
Are Liberals better incumbents?
Another alternative explanation is that Liberal incumbents may be better able to take advantage of incumbency than MPs from other parties. In explaining why the Conservative-Liberal incumbency effect is larger than the Conservative-Labour incumbency effect, we have emphasized the difference in partisan preferences across different party pairs, but clearly the effect of incumbency on perceived valence could also vary across party pairs. One particularly simple mechanism that would produce this variation is if Liberal MPs are systematically better than Labour MPs at converting incumbency into valence benefits, for example because they tend to put more effort into constituency service or are more effective at claiming credit for their efforts. This would provide a particularly straightforward explanation for the variation in incumbency effects we find -an explanation that may have nothing to do with the strength of partisan preferences. Note: See note to Figure 9 ; the outcome here is the perceived effort level of the local MP among BES respondents.
This survey evidence on MPs' perceived effort does point to an intriguing pattern that we view as complementary to our main argument about how partisan preferences and incumbency effects are related. A simple cross-sectional comparison shows that BES respondents who live in constituencies where the top two parties in the previous election were Conservative and Liberal give significantly higher evaluations of their MP's effort than BES respondents who live in constituencies where the top two parties were Conservative and Labour; this is true whether we focus on cases where the previous election was close or not. Thus while Figure 10 suggests that voters do not perceive a difference in effort level between Conservative and Liberal MPs (conditional on a close election), they do perceive a difference between the effort level of, on the one hand, Conservative and Liberal MPs in close races and, on the other, Conservative and Labour MPs in close races. To the extent that such a difference exists, and to the extent to which greater MP effort leads to larger incumbency effects (all else equal), this pattern would tend to produce higher incumbency effects in Conservative-Liberal contests than in Conservative-Labour contests. This could be viewed as an alternative explanation, in the sense that variation in MP effort is the proximate cause of the difference in incumbency effects. But ultimately we view this variation in MP effort as itself an effect of the variation in the intensity of partisan preferences. That is, even if MP effort levels were fixed across party pairings, we expect larger incumbency effects in Conservative-Liberal contests; because
MPs are strategic and understand that the rewards of additional effort are larger in ConservativeLiberal contests, we expect MP effort levels to be higher in contexts where partisan preferences are weaker, which would tend to amplify the ceteris paribus effect.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied multiparty elections in the U.K. to shed light on the relationship between incumbency effects and the strength of voters' partisan preferences. Previous work pointed toward an important role for partisanship in explaining incumbency effects, but most existing findings are open to alternative explanations in part because variation in partisanship tends to coincide with variation in other relevant factors that affect incumbents' chances. Our approach is to compare incumbency effects across partisan matchups in the U.K., showing not only that incumbency effects vary in the way we would expect but that this variation cannot easily be explained by other factors that vary across matchups. Of course, we cannot account for all possible alternative explanations of the patterns we observe, 19 but many of these explanations (e.g. the greater focus of Liberals on "community politics") could also be seen as strategic responses to the difference in strength of partisan preferences that we document. At any rate, it is likely by accumulating several studies with different designs in different settings that we will develop a clearer view of how partisanship, incumbency effects, and electoral accountability are related.
When we view incumbency as a shock to candidate valence whose electoral impact depends on the strength of partisan preferences, it becomes clear that the study of incumbency effects may yield insight into a broader set of issues than has previously been supposed. The dominant view seems to be that studying incumbency effects provides two main payoffs: understanding the degree to which incumbents are insulated from electoral accountability, and assessing how much incumbents do for their constituents (e.g. King 1991; Cox and Morgenstern 1993; Uppal 2009 ). When we recognize that incumbency effects reflect not just incumbent actions but the strength of voters' partisan preferences, it becomes clear that comparative studies of incumbency effects could also yield insights into the extent to which political systems are candidate-centered as opposed to partycentered, which is in turn likely to depend on e.g. the electoral system, the legislative process, and polarization at the elite and mass level. Similarly, although our focus has been on how the strength of partisan preferences affects voters' response to incumbency, the logic applies more broadly to how voters respond to any differences among candidates, including differences in perceived corruption, capability, or policy positions; in that sense, the study of incumbency effects can speak to a broader set of questions about accountability and its relationship with partisan preferences, a question that has been examined in a completely different way by Kayser and Wlezien (2011) and others in the literature on economic voting. Thus while the study of incumbency effects began with concerns about incumbent re-election rates specific to the U.S., the development of comparative work on the topic promises to yield much broader insights into how electoral accountability and partisan competition vary across political systems.
19 An anonymous reviewer noted that voters may vote against incumbents from the government's party; this would tend to reduce the electoral advantages of incumbency in Conservative-Labour contests more than in Conservative-Liberal contests because Liberals are not in government.
